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Abstract
We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose 
information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). 
Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth 
opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision 
that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth oppor-
tunities, managerial discretion does not affect debt maturity, while external 
monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international 
literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related 
to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to 
agency costs and belonging to business holdings. These findings support 
international studies.
Resumen
Abordamos los determinantes de la madurez de la deuda de las empresas chilenas 
utilizando datos, cuya información se extrajo de la Encuesta Longitudinal de 
Empresas (ELE). Los resultados de las regresiones agrupadas de Tobit indican 
que para las empresas con altas oportunidades de crecimiento, la discreciona-
lidad gerencial estimulará plazos de deuda más largos, decisión que contribuye 
a reducir el riesgo de liquidez. Para las empresas con bajas oportunidades de 
crecimiento, la discrecionalidad gerencial no afecta la madurez de la deuda, 
mientras que la supervisión externa la reduce. Estos resultados proporcionan 
nueva evidencia para la literatura internacional. Otras conclusiones sugieren 
que el vencimiento de la deuda está relacionado positivamente con el tamaño 
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de la empresa, la estructura de capital y la tangibilidad de los activos; y está relacionado negati-
vamente con los costos de la agencia y la membresía en una compañía de cartera. Estos hallazgos 
son consistentes con estudios internacionales.
1. Introduction
Decisions on debt terms have been widely researched in recent corporate finance literature. A large 
part of documented evidence shows that debt maturity is positively related to firm size and regula-
tions, but inversely related to growth opportunities and ownership concentration, among other factors. 
Transversely, a factor that also influences debt term is managerial discretion. Managerial discre-
tion should be understood as the opportunist behavior of the manager, who can make decisions for 
personal benefit, rather than in favor of the company, and its owners. These behaviors can increase 
the risk of bankruptcy for the company. The managerial discretion has been mainly considered by 
using agency theory and information asymmetries. 
Costs associated with managerial discretion affect financing policies and terms. Theoretical and 
empirical literature has shown that firms adjust their capital structure to debts in response to higher 
agency costs (Jensen, 1986). This fact becomes more relevant when managerial discretion takes place 
in larger, inefficient firms with low growth opportunities and low debt firms.
Such an effect also influences debt term decisions. Companies with high agency costs usually 
reduce debt maturity periods to mitigate overinvestment. Reducing debt terms disciplines adminis-
trators, making debt payment a priority over asset accumulation under their control (Leland, 1998; 
Lasfer, 1999; Ozkan, 2000; Jiraporn and Tong, 2008; Alcock et al., 2011). Endogenously, this form of 
financing policy reduces managerial discretion.
The degree of discretion and its effect on debt maturity can also be seen through the asymmetric 
information theory. A greater degree of asymmetric information promotes opportunistic behavior by 
managers, generating conflicts of interest and in turn affecting company credit quality (Ross, 1977). 
This fact can increase the liquidity risk or default probability (Flannery, 1986).
Most studies focus on developed markets such as those in the United States and Europe. Howe-
ver, in emerging markets, and specifically in Chile, evidence is sparse, and the effect of managerial 
discretion on debt maturity is still an unexplored subject. 
In Chile, access to financing by companies is heterogeneous, mainly respect to the debt maturity 
contracted. On the one hand, mature and long operating history firms have access to the markets of 
bank debt and fixed incomes, which are usually contracted in the long term. Although these compa-
nies are characterized by low growth opportunities, financing appears to be explained more by the 
composition of their assets and diluted ownership structure. According to data from the Longitudinal 
Business Survey (ELE), these companies would not represent more than 20% of Chile's universal bu-
sinesses. On the other hand, companies with greater growth options are generally subject to greater 
operational risk and a limited pool of assets, which restrict debt from a purely bank and short-term 
source. This type of debt in many cases leads these companies towards a high liquidity risk that, 
afterwards can lead to bankruptcy.
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In relation to managerial discretion in Chile, the ELE reports that in companies with high growth 
opportunities there is a greater turnover of managers and a greater asymmetry of information as-
sociated with their performance. If the opportunistic behavior of the managers increases the risk of 
insolvency or liquidity of the firm, then these could be associated with the issuance of short-term 
debt. However, greater supervision of the owners or self-imposed non-discretionary behavior by the 
managers themselves could mitigate this risk, promoting longer-term debt. The latter may occur if 
growth opportunities are themselves an implicit control mechanism such as Smith and Watts (1992) 
and Gaver and Gaver (1995) point out. These authors indicate that the managers associate the firm's 
growth opportunities with greater economic compensation, which leads them to act in line with 
business objectives.
This leads us to believe that the growth opportunities of Chilean companies not only condition 
the maturity of the debt they contract, but also the manager’s preference over the debt contracted. 
That is, between encouraging or mitigating the risk of financial insolvency of the firm they manage.
The main objective of this research is to analyze the factors that determine the debt maturity of 
Chilean companies. This requires data on a large sample of firms drawn from the Longitudinal Survey 
of Companies (ELE). This study contributes to the existing literature through two aspects. Firstly, 
we empirically analyze the effect of past managerial discretion on debt terms in current firms. In this 
research, discretion is associated with behaviors that the manager developed in other companies in 
the past, and that potentially can be propagated or controlled in their current companies, affecting 
the debt maturity decision. The final effect on debt maturity depends on the trade-off between past 
managerial discretion and actual internal monitoring mechanisms implicit in their growth oppor-
tunities. Secondly, we analyze the interaction between the preference for liquidity or control of the 
problems associated with non-optimal investment policies.
The sample characteristics also reinforce this study’s empirical contribution. The diversity of 
companies in terms of size, organizational structures, ownership structures and growth options allow 
us to analyze the determinants of debt maturity beyond the companies listed on the stock exchange. 
These features differ from previous studies in Chile.
Our results demonstrate that debt maturity is positively affected by past managerial discretion when 
firms have high growth opportunities. Nonetheless, it does not have a significant effect when these 
opportunities are low. These observations validate the trade-off hypothesis and the greater effects of 
internal monitoring mechanisms on managerial discretion in firms with high growth opportunities.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on relevant topics of debt maturity and its relationship with agency theory, asymmetric 
information, and managerial discretion. In Section 3, we present the hypotheses of this research. 
The section 4 presents the variables and statistical and econometric methods while in Section 5 we 
present the main results. Finally, Section 6 compiles our main conclusions as well as possible exten-
sions of this research.
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2. Literature review
2.1. International evidence
Theoretical and empirical literature has extensively studied debt maturity determinants with a clear 
emphasis on developed markets. Among these factors is managerial discretion, whose effects on debt 
maturity have been analyzed by agency theories and information asymmetries.
The effect of managerial discretion on debt maturity is studied by the agency theory and typically 
focusing on the problem of overinvestment. Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
showed that firms adjust their capital structures towards debt when faced with higher agency costs. 
This aspect has been corroborated by various empirical studies, such as those conducted by Kim 
and Sorensen (1986), Ang et al. (2000), Harvey et al. (2003), Fleming et al. (2005), Mohd et al. (2012), 
Kokoreva and Ulugova (2013), and Rakesh and Lakshmi (2013). The purpose of debt, as described by 
Jensen (1986), is to discipline managers and endogenously mitigate managerial discretion costs. This 
result has been confirmed mainly for larger, inefficient firms with low growth opportunities (Jensen, 
1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Stulz, 2000).
Capital structure adjustments towards debts are normally associated with a shortening of matu-
rity. Leland (1998) developed a theoretical basis, indicating that companies shorten debt maturity in 
response to higher agency costs. Lasfer (1999) empirically argued that large companies, characterized 
by high agency costs, make use of short-term borrowing mechanisms to meet such costs.
Empirical studies, such as those by Ozkan (2000), Jiraporn and Tong (2008), and Alcock et al. 
(2011), confirmed previous results with the addition that ownership concentration also affects this 
relationship by acting inversely on debt maturity. This is due to the fact that short-term debts and 
concentration of ownership exercise a monitoring role for administrators. Datta et al. (2005), in an 
empirical study of 4,514 companies from the United States, concluded that ownership concentration 
and/or higher managerial shareholdings are inversely related to debt maturity. Alcock et al. (2011) 
provided further insight into the preliminary analysis, indicating that as owners and managers have 
increasingly aligned interests, the inverse effect of agency costs on debt maturity is reduced.
Other international studies have addressed the effects of managerial discretion on debt maturi-
ties from the perspective of ownership dilution. Berger et al. (1997) noted that debts increase when 
managers notice that their equity share in the company has decreased. This is explained by the role 
of managers in generating agency costs. Datta et al. (2005), Benmelech (2006), Harford et al. (2008), 
and Tanaka (2015) added that entrenched managers increase debt maturity, making more space 
for future discretionary behavior. Nevertheless, evidence has shown that managerial discretion is 
mitigated endogenously with the use of shorter-term debt (DeAngelo et al., 2002).
Companies with high agency costs also have other characteristics that, according to empirical 
evidence, determine debt maturity. Barclay and Smith (1995, 1996) and Cuñat (1999) noted that large 
or regulated companies with low growth opportunities are characterized by a higher proportion of 
long-term debt in their capital structure. Although international evidence has shown that large com-
panies shorten debt terms to mitigate agency costs, the authors added that the incidence of size is 
explained in the sense that smaller companies rely more on bank credit. This aspect is corroborated 
by Johnson (1997).
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The effect of managerial discretion on debt maturity is studied by the asymmetric information 
theory, typically focusing on the problem of underinvestment. Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argued that firms shorten debt maturity in response to underinvestment problems that are 
generated by managerial/owner discretion. Authors suggest that if companies have higher growth 
opportunities in their investment set, these companies should use short-term debts to eliminate the 
disincentive to invest. Billet et al. (2007), Jiraporn and Tong (2008), and Alcock et al. (2011) added 
that this measure reduces managerial discretion as the manager is exposed to external monitoring.
Information asymmetry can promote opportunistic behavior by managers. Such behavior is ba-
sed on underinvestment, in order to increase their wealth at the expense of the firm's credit quality. 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977). Johnson (2003) noted that companies exchange the costs of un-
derinvestment with liquidity risk costs when choosing debt maturities. This reflects the contradictory 
results found in empirical evidence. On one hand, Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991), Guedes and Olper 
(1996), and Berger et al. (2005) noted that lower risk firms prefer debts with shorter maturities. For 
these companies, the cost of underinvestment problems is more relevant than liquidity risks. On the 
other hand, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) indicated that low risk firms have 
longer debt maturities due to the greater importance of liquidity risk.
But Smith and Watts (1992), Collins et al. (1995) and Gaver and Gaver (1995) argue that managers 
associate the greatest growth opportunities with better economic compensation. These results could 
generate a reduction effect of managerial discretion greater than that obtained by the issuance of 
short-term debt (Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984), allowing a greater proportion of long-term 
debt to mitigate the firm's insolvency risk
Asset composition also determines debt maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996), Graham and Harvey 
(2001), Scherr and Hurlburt (2001), Ozkan (2000, 2002), and Heyman et al. (2008) added that firms 
attempt to match the maturity of their debts with their assets. Thus, as investments in assets are 
more tangible, firms will employ long-term debt in order to mitigate liquidity risk.
Studies addressing debt maturity determinants in emerging markets are limited, due to differen-
ces in the economic and institutional context. Joeveer (2013), analyzed companies from 9 emerging 
European countries and concluded that country characteristics have a greater impact on the level and 
term of small company debts, while firm characteristics have a greater influence on large companies. 
Similar results were found by Mokhova and Zinecker (2014).
In the Latin American market there is also relevant evidence about the factors that determine the 
debt maturity. Kirch and Soares (2012) point out that the financial development of Latin American 
markets does not affect corporate debt maturity. However, a higher quality institutional environment 
does affect debt maturity positively, favoring long term debt.
Mateus and Terra (2013) studied debt maturity for 986 Latin American firms and 686 Eastern 
European firms. Their results highlight the differences between these markets. In Latin America, 
debt and maturity are considered complementary policies, while they are considered substitutes in 
Eastern Europe. Soares (2009, 2011) supported these results for companies in Latin America.
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2.2. Evidence in the Chilean market
There are few studies on debt maturity in Chile, and all of them are oriented toward companies listed 
on the stock market. 
Azofra et al. (2004) developed an empirical analysis using incomplete panel data for 169 companies 
between 1990 and 2001. The authors noted that the high ownership concentration, along with the 
presence of growth opportunities in Chilean companies, favored debt as a financing source. Further-
more, when these companies require external funding, they decide to fund their growth opportunities 
through short-term debts. Another result from their research is that larger companies with a greater 
need for funds prefer more extensive debt maturities. Saona and Vallelado (2005) supported earlier 
findings, concluding that firms with high growth opportunities, concentrated ownership, and the need 
for external funding, issue short-term debts to finance their investments. This evidence supports 
the idea that short-term debt is an efficient funding mechanism that mitigates problems related to 
agency costs and information asymmetries. 
More recently, Saona and Vallelado (2014), in a comparative study of Chilean and Spanish firms, 
maintained that firms confront a trade-off between debt maturity and bank share in the firm’s ow-
nership structure. In firms that allow banks to become stockholders, managers shorten maturity as 
an instrument of corporate governance. The authors further added that this decision depends on 
the firm’s growth opportunities. 
Castañeda and Contreras (2016) elaborated an empirical study based on 50 Chilean companies and 
concluded that debt maturity, mainly greater than a year, is concentrated mostly in large regulated 
companies with low growth opportunities. They add that information asymmetries tend to shorten 
Chilean company debt terms.
Our work extends literature on debt maturity for Chilean firms, but differs from previous studies 
for two reasons. First, our study measures the effect of managerial discretion on the debt maturity 
decision. Second, through medium-sized, small and micro-enterprise sampling, it was possible to 
analyze the debt maturity decision in a different context in terms of access to financing. Nearly two 
thirds of the samples were taken from small and micro firms, for which credit access and liquidity 
conditions could affect debt maturity, differing from firms listed on the stock exchange.
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3. Hypotheses
The main objective of our investigation is to determine factors that affect debt maturity of chilean 
companies in a context of differentiated growth opportunities. The hypotheses seek to answer this 
question, focusing the analysis on managerial discretion, debt and agency costs.
Johnson (2003) points out that the relationship between debt term and debt will depend on the 
trade-off between the preference to mitigate liquidity risks or the underinvestment problem. When 
this relationship is positive, firms prefer to mitigate the liquidity problem over the underinvestment 
problem, and vice versa. In the case of Chile, given the difficulty faced by companies when accessing 
financing and the pressure to ensure payment, we believe that there is a preference for liquidity at the 
moment of acquiring the debt. A decision that results in the issuance of longer term debt. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1: In Chilean firms exists a positive relationship between debt and debt term.
As mentioned, Chilean firms with greater growth opportunities are mainly financed by short-
term bank debt and have a high operational risk associated with them. These factors raise the risk of 
insolvency of the firm. Additionally, in this type of companies, there is a greater rotation of managers 
and ignorance about their past performance. For this reason we believe that managerial discretion 
may be another factor that affects the maturity of the debts contracted by firms according to the 
level of growth opportunities they have. 
Discretionary managerial behavior can increase the risk of firm insolvency, especially if the firm 
lacks growth opportunities. However, Smith y Watts (1992), Collins et al. (1995) and Gaver and Gaver 
(1995) argue that managers associate the greatest growth opportunities with better economic com-
pensation. According to the authors, this relationship reduces managerial discretion, allowing them 
to act in alignment with the corporate objectives. If conduct is aligned with business objectives, the 
risk of insolvency is mitigated by selecting a longer debt term. Therefore, we formulate the following 
hypotheses for Chilean firms:
H2: In Chilean firms exists a positive relationship between past managerial discretion and debt term.
Depending on growth opportunities, loan decisions and managerial discretion can act together on 
debt maturity in Chilean firms. When growth opportunities are high, the effect on the debt maturity 
from potential agency costs are associated with non-optimal investment policies (overinvestment/
underinvestment) which may be lower relative to the costs associated with liquidity risk (Stohs and 
Mauer, 1996). In this case, managers can reinforce their preference for liquidity, increasing the term 
of the additional debt. However, when growth opportunities are low, agency costs can lead to the 
reduction of debt maturities in order to mitigate non-optimal investment policy problems (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Leland, 1998; Lasfer, 1999). Therefore, the following hypotheses are raised:
H3: The Chilean firms prefer to mitigate liquidity risks with respect to non-optimal investment policies.
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4. Data and Methods
4.1. Data
Data used in this research was obtained from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE), prepared 
by Chile’s Ministry of Economy, Development, and Tourism. Surveys were published in version 1 
(ELE1), 2 (ELE2) and 3 (ELE3), containing qualitative and quantitative information on Chilean firms 
for the periods of 2007, 2009 and 2013, respectively. According to the ministry, the objective of this 
survey is to characterize the country's enterprises by size and economic activity, in order to identify 
business development determinants. 
Table 1. Size and structure of firm samples.
Firm size by net sale level
Legal organization Larger Medium Small Micro Total
Open corporation (OC) 149 27 18 8 202
Closed corporation (CC) 1391 618 401 195 2604
Limited liability company (LLC) 937 1044 1546 1008 4535
Individual limited liability company (ILLC) 60 67 156 119 402
Natural person (NP) 61 262 1636 4475 6434
Other structures 99 77 125 240 541
Full sample (firms) 2697 2096 3881 6045 14719
Firm size distribution (%) 18.32 14.24 26.37 41.07 100
Source: Own elaboration
The main advantage provided by the ELE is the possibility of obtaining a representative sample in 
terms of size and organizational structures that have not been previously studied in Chile. According 
to Table 1, the total sample from all three versions of the ELE is distributed over 2697 large (18.32% of 
the sample), 2096 midsize (14.24%), 3881 small (26.37%), and 6045 micro (41.07%) enterprises. Large 
enterprises are mainly public companies (open and close equity) in which ownership and corporate 
control are separated, while micro and small enterprises are structured mainly as limited liability 
companies or one-person companies in which it is possible to observe total ownership concentration 
in the manager.
Utilizing information contained in the all versions of the ELE, a set of relevant information was 
developed mainly for accounting, financing, and administration. A pooled database was compiled 
from 14719 companies, distributed across 6647 (ELE1), 3882 (ELE2), and 4190 companies (ELE3). 
Firms with incomplete records and those in the financial intermediation sector were eliminated. Table 
2 summarizes the categories of variables and their measurements. 
Table 2. Categories and variable measurement.
Variable Definition
A. Agency costs 
 Operating expenses to sales (AC) Annual operating expenses to sales ratio
B. Growth opportunities
 Return on assets (ROA) Net income to total assets ratio
C. Ownership structure (OS)
 Owner/manager Dummy 1 if the manager is total owner and 0 otherwise
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Variable Definition
 Business associate manager Dummy 1 if the manager is an associate manager and 0 otherwise
 Outsider Manager Dummy 1 if the manager is outsider (non-owner) and 0 otherwise
D. Manager discretion (MD)
 Previous dismissal Dummy 1 if the manager was fired from his previous managerial job
 Non-operating business Number of non-operating businesses previously managed by the manager
E. Financing and external monitoring
 Debt to equity (LEV) Total debt to equity ratio
 Monitoring of external funders (EM) Years extension of the relationship with external funders
 Debt maturity (M) Long-term liabilities on total debt ratio
F. Other control variables
 Size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets
 Holding (HD) Dummy 1 if the firm belongs to business holding and 0 otherwise
 Tangibility (TANG) Long-term assets on total assets ratio
Source: Own elaboration.
The dependent variable of the study is the debt maturity and the variable for growth opportunities 
is the variable used to separate the sample into two subsamples; which are then defined.
Debt maturity. This is the dependent variable of the investigation. The debt maturity of the firm 
(M) is measured by the long-term debt to total debt ratio. This form of measurement has been widely 
used in previous studies carried out both in Chile (Azofra et al., 2004, Saona and Vallelado, 2005) and 
in other countries (Lasfer 1999, Mateus and Terra, 2013). Measures ranked in years as elaborated by 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Jiraporn and Tong (2008) are not possible to apply without an exact 
record of debt maturity from the companies within the sample.
Growth opportunities. We measure the firm's growth opportunities through Returns On Assets 
(ROA). Danbolt et al. (2011) note that accounting indicators of actual returns such as ROA or ROE are 
positively and significantly correlated with measures of future firm growth (market to book equity, 
price to earnings per share, or Tobin's Q). The ROA is used to separate samples between firms with 
high and low growth opportunities as well as to verify the conditional effect of other variables on 
debt maturity. We calculated ROA for each company to later determine this indicator's average in 
each economic sector and survey. Firms with high growth opportunities possess an above-average 
ROA, while firms with below-average ROAs were classified as having low growth opportunities.
Control variables correspond to managerial discretion, agency costs, capital structure, external 
monitoring, ownership structure, assets tangibility, belonging to business holdings and firm size. 
These variables are detailed below.
Managerial discretion. Managerial discretion (MD) is measured by the dummy variable previous 
dismissal (value 1 if the manager was dismissed from his/her previous management position and 0 
otherwise) and by the number of previous businesses that ceased to operate under the management 
of the manager. Both measures have not been evaluated in the empirical literature. Hambrick and 
Abrahamson (1995) and Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) point out that the measurement of managerial 
discretion is a complex process. But the advantage of measuring these past discretionary behaviors 
is that they make it possible to determine if such behaviors are mitigated or prevailing in their current 
companies, which will depend on the effectiveness of the implicit monitoring mechanisms of these 
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companies. If such mechanisms are effective, these opportunistic behaviors would be mitigated, 
which would reduce the liquidity risk of the current company through the choice of long-term debt. 
Otherwise, the discretionary behavior of the manager will increase liquidity risk by encouraging the 
issuance of short-term debt. Finally, the effect of managerial discretion on the debt maturity will 
depend on the trade-off between the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms implicit in growth 
opportunities and the past discretionary behavior of the manager.
Agency costs. Agency costs (AC) are used to measure the effect of non-optimal investment policies 
(overinvestment/underinvestment) on debt maturity (Lasfer, 1999; Ozkan, 2000; Jiraporn and Tong, 
2008; Alcock et al., 2011). This measure was proposed by Ang et al. (2000) and has been widely used 
in a variety of empirical studies.
Capital structure. Debt (LEV) is measured by the debt to equity ratio. As a maturity determinant, 
is included to quantify the preference for mitigating overinvestment/underinvestment (Flannery, 
1986; Diamond, 1991; Guedes and Olper, 1996; Berger et al, 2005) or liquidity risk (Barclay and Smith 
1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996).
External monitoring. The monitoring of external financers (EM) is measured by the length of the 
business relationship between the company and its financiers (Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005). 
The longer this term, the greater the monitoring done by external financiers. However, this variable 
implicitly quantifies the trust or distrust of the external financiers as to the term of payment of the 
funds that contribute to the financing of the company. A negative (positive) relationship between this 
variable and the debt maturity is indicative of commercial mistrust (trust), so that greater external 
monitoring will promote a reduction (extension) of such maturity.
Ownership structure Ownership structure (OS) is measured by three dummy variables associated with 
the role of the manager in the ownership structure (owner/manager, partner, and manager/outsider). 
These ownership structure variables are  used to measure alignment effects (Ozkan, 2000; Jiraporn 
and Tong, 2008; Alcock et al, 2011) or managerial entrenchment (Datta et al, 2005; Benmelech., 2006; 
Harford et al, 2008; Tanaka, 2015) caused by concentration and dilution of ownership, respectively.
Assets tangibility. Tangible assets (TANG) is measured by long-term assets to the total assets 
ratio of the company. This measure of tangibility or maturity of the assets has been widely used by 
various international studies to verify if the term of the debts is matched with the maturity of the 
assets (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Scherr and Hurlburt, 2001; Ozkan, 2000, 
2002; Heyman et al., 2008).
Other control variables are included such as size and whether the company belongs to a business 
holding, which are in line with other empirical studies.
4.2. Econometric method
To estimate the determinants of debt maturity for Chilean companies, a pooled Two-limit Tobit 
regression (2LTR) model was estimated. The use of the 2LTR model is justified because the debt 
maturity is a continuous variable censored between 0 and 1, for firms that have between 0% and 100% 
of long-term debt. This model is estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) and problems of efficiency 
associated with the estimation are corrected with the use of robust variances. The empirical model 
used is as follows:
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(1)
Where Mit is the variable for debt maturity, which is censored in the [0,1] interval. The OSit variable 
measures ownership structure, defined by three dichotomous variables described in table 2. The MDit 
variable corresponds to managerial discretion, measured by the number of previous non-operating 
businesses and the dummy variable for previous dismissal. The ACit variable represents agency 
costs, SIZEit is the firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, EMit is the variable that 
measures monitoring of external funders, LEVit is the debt to equity ratio, HDit is a dummy variable 
assigned to a value of 1 if the company belongs to a business holding, and 0 otherwise, and TANGit 
indicates asset tangibility.
The estimated model includes dummies in order to control differences by economic sector and 
by time-year. 
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 3 shows the data descriptive statistics. It is important to note that the surveys are not strictly 
comparable due to differences in sample size and the fact that companies are not necessarily repeated 
from one sample to another.
Descriptive results show that agency costs, measured by the operating expenses to sales ratio, 
represent 11.38%, 24.50%, and 17.75% on average, respectively. Regarding ELE1, an incremental ten-
dency of agency costs is shown towards other surveys.
From ELE1, we observe that the percentage of companies managed by their owners falls from 
35.71% to 18.15%, while those with an outsider manager increases from 27.23% to 45.19%. This is due 
to the fact that in ELE1 sampling design, small and micro enterprises have greater participation, while 
large enterprises are most likely to participate in ELE3. Regarding 2007, the proportion of companies 
managed by an owner/manager fell to 14.07% in 2009 and 17.56% in 2013. Accordingly, we observed 
lower managerial ownership, with figures ranging from 52.57% equity in ELE1 to 35.45% in ELE3. 
This fact is related to the greater agency costs described previously.
Measures of managerial discretion for 2007 indicate that 5.86% of current company managers 
were dismissed from their previous managerial job and/or 1.33 companies stopped operating under 
their previous management. This first proportion dropped to 2.89% and 1.51% for 2009 and 2013, 
respectively, while the second figure fell from 0.39 to 0.25. This may be due to the increased parti-
cipation of large enterprises in ELE3. 
As the managers are contracted for current managerial jobs, the history of discretion behavior 
could be offset by restriction mechanisms imposed by the manager himself to improve his discretion, 
or by means of internal monitoring by owners. This variable captures two expected potential effects 
on debt maturity given past history. On one hand, a negative ex-ante effect will be defined, marked 
by the dominance of past managerial discretion on their current behavior. On the other hand, positive 
Mit = β0 + β2 OSit MDit + β3 ACit + β4 SIZEit + β5 EMit + β6LEVit
+ β7 HDit + β8 TANGit + δ0 DSector + δ1 DYear + εit
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ex-post effects are defined and outlined by internal monitoring mechanisms, and restrictions are set 
by managers for their current performance. It was anticipated that the trade-off between both of 
these would define the final effect on debt maturity.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables
2007 2009 2013
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
A. Agency costs
Operating expenses to sales (%) 11.38 15.74 24.50 21.12 17.75 18.30
B. Ownership structure
Owner/manager (%) 35.71 49.60 21.64 41.21 18.15 38.54
Business associate manager (%) 38.04 48.66 41.05 49.29 36.63 48.18
Outsider Manager (%) 27.23 45.85 38.29 47.47 45.19 49.77
C. Manager discretion 
Previous dismissal (%) 5.86 22.49 2.89 12.64 1.51 12.21
Non-operating business 1.33 1.44 0.39 0.93 0.25 0.65
D. Financing and external monitoring
Debt to equity 1.45 2.14 1.52 2.13 2.09 2.56
Monitoring of external funders 12.82 12.54 12.65 10.16 16.33 11.56
Debt maturity 16.63 28.81 17.01 28.16 19.72 28.96
E. Other control variables
Firm size (Total assets, Million $) 20443 338402 150163 816120 168401 683462
Holding (%) 13.57 34.25 21.52 41.10 29.37 45.55
Tangibility (%) 28.56 27.62 29.31 26.67 22.65 26.05
Source: Own elaboration.
Regarding capital structure, it is observed in aggregate terms that Chilean companies mostly 
use debt as a financing source in relation to equity; this debt is mainly short-term. Firms maintain 
commercial relations with external funders who play a monitoring role for companies and their ma-
nagement. This relationship ranges between 12 and 16 years on average.
Results also show that most Chilean companies do not belong to business holdings and tend 
to adopt an important proportion of long-term assets (tangibility), although not primarily in their 
accounting structure.
5.2. Univariate analysis for growth opportunities
In this section, we will conduct non-parametric tests aimed at verifying the differences in company 
samples according to their growth opportunities.
Growth opportunities were measured using Return on Assets (ROA). Since the ELE only provides 
accounting data and not market data, this proxy may impose a limitation. However, Danbolt et al. (2011) 
note that accounting indicators of actual returns such as ROA or ROE are positively and significantly 
correlated with measures of future firm growth (market to book equity, price to earnings per share, 
or Tobin's Q). This justifies the use of this proxy.
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For characterization of each company, based on said quality, we calculated ROA for each com-
pany to later determine this indicator's average in each economic sector and survey. Firms with high 
growth opportunities possess an above-average ROA, while firms with below-average ROAs were 
classified as having low growth opportunities. By this criterion, the original sample was divided into 
6,917 companies with high growth opportunities (2,984 companies from ELE1, 1,817 from ELE2 and 
2,116 from ELE3) and 7,802 with low growth opportunities (3,663 companies from ELE1, 2,065 from 
ELE2 and 2074 from ELE3).
Separating samples according to growth opportunities is based on the approaches of Jensen 
(1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995). Companies with high growth opportunities are characterized 
by a high ownership concentration. This aspect acts by monitoring managerial discretion, which may 
implicitly affect the debt maturity decision. Furthermore, Muñoz and Sepulveda (2016) corroborated 
this idea and added that for firms with low growth opportunities, internal monitoring is less effective 
on agency costs, leading greater company debt. 
The results from Table 4 indicate differences between the groups of companies. Despite diffe-
rences in company sizes, the Wilcoxon test results are cross-sectional with each of the ELE surveys.
It was noted that firms with high growth opportunities have lower agency costs with respect to 
companies with low growth opportunities. Differences between operating expenses to sales ratio 
are significant at 1%. These results are consistent with Jensen (1986) in the sense that firms with low 
growth opportunities have a greater incentive to incur agency costs associated with overinvestment.
Table 4. Wilcoxon test, mean differences by growth opportunity level.
Variables
2007 2009 2013
High Low z High Low z High Low z
A. Agency costs
Operating 
expenses to 
sales (%)
11.55 12.91 (-4.26)*** 23.43 26.38 (-4.94)*** 15.24 19.47 (-9.80)***
B. Ownership structure
Owner/
manager (%)
52.18 24.96 (24.43)*** 40.16 17.04 (19.13)*** 39.62 9.85 (21.58)***
Business 
associate 
manager (%)
32.26 40.03 (-5.85)*** 38.57 41.11 (-2.06)** 31.26 34.86 (-3.80)***
Outsider 
Manager (%)
15.56 35.01 (-21.49)*** 21.27 41.85 (-17.03)*** 29.12 55.29 (-22.89)***
C. Manager discretion 
Previous 
dismissal (%)
8.47 4.45 (6.35)*** 2.44 1.51 (2.9)*** 2.36 0.94 (4.48)***
Non-operating 
business
1.32 1.35 (-0.31) 0.37 0.41 (-1.02) 0.28 0.21   (1.58)
D. Financing and external monitoring
Debt to equity 1.17 1.63 (-8.88)*** 1.24 1.77 (-8.56)*** 1.81 2.70 (-9.93)***
Monitoring 
of external 
funders
10.96 14.84 (-13.79)*** 10.84 14.54 (-14.60)*** 14.87 17.31 (-8.13)***
Debt maturity 12.73 21.20 (-12.86)*** 10.48 20.91 (-15.43)*** 15.15 22.59 (-10.77)***
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Variables
2007 2009 2013
High Low z High Low z High Low z
E. Other control variable
Firm size (Total 
assets, MM$)
9113 28303 (-3.33)*** 10919 237292 (-4.28)*** 21692 301479 (-5.77)***
Holding (%) 6.36 19.89 (-20.92)*** 10.23 29.40 (-21.23)*** 16.32 38.10 (-21.66)***
Tangibility (%) 22.81 33.25 (-16.74)*** 24.22 33.13 (-12.87)*** 21.33 23.50 (-6.44)***
 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration.
Regarding ownership structure, we find that firms with high growth opportunities are managed 
to a greater extent by their owners. On the other hand, firms with low growth opportunities are 
managed by a manager with partial ownership (partner) or an outsider. Differences in management 
proportions and company control are significant at 1%. This supports Jensen (1986), Fleming et al. 
(2005), and Muñoz and Sepulveda (2016) in the sense that firms with low growth opportunities are 
more likely to incur high agency costs when a greater degree of separation exists between ownership 
and corporate control.
Statistically significant differences were also observed regarding debt. We note that firms with low 
growth opportunities have a higher level of leverage and a more extensive relationship with external 
funders with respect to firms with higher growth opportunities. Therefore, consistent with Jensen 
(1986), companies tend to be monitored by financial institutions and/or external creditors as their 
investment projects are limited. Furthermore, firms tend to be financed mostly through short-term 
debts, although firms with high growth opportunities have lower debt maturity.
Managerial discretion variables indicate that firms with high growth opportunities have higher 
proportions of managers who were dismissed from their previous managerial jobs. This result shows 
the possibility of such firms to hire these outsiders using a costly approach to monitor and control 
their discretionary behavior. Meanwhile, the variable representing the number of previous non-ope-
rative businesses does not differ significantly between firms with high or low growth opportunities.
Results for the tangibility variable reveal that, on average, there is a higher level of this kind of 
assets in firms with low growth opportunities.
For the other control variables, such as size (using total assets as a proxy, measured in millions 
of pesos), we observed that companies with low growth opportunities are usually larger companies. 
Additionally, we find that there are a higher proportion of companies with low growth opportunities 
that belong to holdings. This difference is significant at 1%.
5.3. Tobit regression analysis
It was concluded in the previous section that growth opportunities affect Chilean companies’ financing 
policies. Companies with low growth opportunities are characterized by having diluted ownership 
structures, higher agency costs, and being larger companies. These factors induce higher leverage, 
thus weighing on the financial decision of debt terms.
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Regression results from specification (1), specifically marginal effects, are presented in Tables 5 
and 6 for companies with high and low growth opportunities, respectively. All model specifications 
control differences by economic sectors and time-year through dummy variables.
First, we analyzed firms with high growth opportunities, as described in Table 5. If agency costs 
increase by 1%, debt maturity (long-term debt) is reduced between 2.98% to 6.11% according to the 
model specifications. Firms with higher agency costs reduce debt maturities, a result that is consistent 
with previous research (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay and Smith, 1996; Leland, 1998; Lasfer, 1999; 
Jiraporn and Tong, 2008; Alcock et al, 2011). In addition, larger companies lengthen debt maturities. 
When firm size increases by 1%, the long-term debt that quantifies the financing maturity increases 
between 1.39% and 1.79%.
A significant and positive relationship was found between debt maturity and debt level. When 
debt increases by $1 respect to equity, debt maturity (long-term debt) increases between 1.09% 
and 1.31%. This support hypothesis H1 and proves that firms prefer longer debt maturities. Johnson 
(2003) argues that by including debt as a determinant of maturity, positive relationships found are 
synonymous with firm preference to mitigate liquidity risk or increase firm’s credit quality. This 
evidence is supported through the results obtained by Barclay and Smith (1995, 1996) and Stohs and 
Mauer (1996). Therefore, for Chilean companies with high growth opportunities, costs associated 
with liquidity risk are greater than those generated from underinvestment problems.
At a significance level of 1%, a direct relationship was found between debt maturity and asset 
tangibility. We note that if long-term assets increase by 1%, long-term debt increases between 6.20% 
and 7.16%. These results corroborate previous studies (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Heyman et al, 2008). Chilean companies with 
high growth opportunities match the maturity for assets and debts to mitigate short-term insolvency 
risks associated with potential agency problems.
External monitoring is not a relevant variable for the debt term decision of companies with high 
growth opportunities.
An inverse and significant relationship is observed between debt maturity and firms belonging 
to business holdings. If the firm belongs to a business holding, debt maturity (long-term debt) is 
reduced between 1.37% and 2.38%. Chilean firms establish a financial hierarchy based on internal 
capital market to business holdings, with lower funding costs and less restrictive contracts when 
compared to foreign markets. Our results support findings by Azofra et al. (2004) and suggest that 
firm financial deficits are financed by internal loans to business holdings. If the firm needs additional 
resources, it will issue debt with lower financing costs and short-term maturities. This result implicitly 
mitigates the potential effect of underinvestment, suggesting compliance with the pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
It can be seen that firms with high growth opportunities, managed by their owners, have shorter 
debt maturities (debt maturity is reduced between 1.16% and 1.56% in this type of ownership structure) 
when compared to those managed by a partner, in which case the debt term increases significantly 
(between 1.11% and 1.77% in this type of ownership structure). This result contends that ownership 
concentration reduces debt maturity, confirming international results contributed by Ozkan (2000), 
Jiraporn and Tong (2008), Alcock et al. (2011), Azofra et al. (2004), and Saona and Vallelado (2005) 
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for the Chilean market. Additionally, it also demonstrates the effects of managerial entrenchment on 
debt maturity (Datta et al., 2005; Benmelech, 2006, Harford et al., 2008; Tanaka, 2015).
Table 5. Tobit regression, debt maturity in firms with high growth opportunities.
Variable Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Owner/manager
-0.0116   -0.0156   
(-2.47)** (-2.31)**
Business associate manager
0.0111 0.0177
(2.71)*** (2.35)**
Outsider Manager
-0.0036 -0.0027
(-0.74) (-0.71)
Previous dismissal
0.0140 0.0147 0.0161
(3.06)*** (2.93)*** (3.45)***
Non-operating business
0.0129 0.0099 0.0079
(3.19)*** (3.63)*** (2.91)***
Operating expenses to sales
-0.0316 -0.0611 -0.0298 -0.0562 -0.0519 -0.0549
(-3.65)*** (-3.91)*** (-4.17)*** (-4.15)*** (-4.01)*** (-3.84)***
Size
0.0139 0.0151 0.0147 0.0161 0.0177 0.0179
(17.35)*** (20.48)*** (21.03)*** (8.34)*** (9.73)*** (11.37)***
Monitoring of external funders
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.20) (-0.29) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.44)
Debt to equity
0.0117 0.0118 0.0131 0.0109 0.0124 0.0110
(19.22)*** (17.35)*** (17.44)*** (9.01)*** (8.52)*** (9.11)***
Holding
-0.0164 -0.0137 -0.0155 -0.0229 -0.0220 -0.0238
(-3.44)*** (-3.26)*** (-3.52)*** (-3.13)*** (-2.93)*** (-3.53)***
Tangibility
0.0716 0.0711 0.0703 0.0642 0.0651 0.0620
(14.84)*** (14.77)*** (14.82)*** (7.03)*** (7.34)*** (6.86)***
Test 1 (11.74)*** (18.14)*** (7.98)*** (13.02)*** (15.29)*** (16.95)***
Observations (firms) 6917 6917 6917 6917 6917 6917
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.46 0.43
 
Estimated by maximum likelihood and use of robust variances. Marginal effects. Z-statistics in brackets. 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration.
The variable numbers of non-operating businesses and previous dismissal, measuring past ma-
nagerial discretion, have positive and significant effects on debt maturity. The fact that the manager 
was dismissed from his previous managerial work increases the debt maturity (long-term debt) 
between 1.40% and 1.61%, while for each business that stopped operating because of his managerial 
management in other companies, debt maturity increases between 0.79% and 1.29% in its current 
company. This support  hypothesis H2. These unprecedented results show that in firms with high 
growth opportunities, internal monitoring mechanisms, or self-imposed restrictions by administra-
tors, dominate past managerial discretions, increasing debt terms. At the moment of current debt 
issue, this evidence supports the hypothesis that these managers prefer the liquidity of the firms.
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We include the effect of agency costs in Test 1, which measures the null hypothesis H0: β2 + β6 + β3 > 0. 
This hypothesis compares the preference for liquidity in the debt decision and discretionary mana-
gement in relation to effects of agency costs on debt maturity. As observed, this test is rejected at 1% 
for all specifications. Firms with high growth opportunities have a greater tendency to reduce debt 
maturity. Such actions constitute a greater preference for mitigating overinvestment problems in 
relation to liquidity risk. Thus, the hypothesis H3 cannot be sustained.
Secondly, we analyze Table 6, which provides results for companies with low growth opportunities.
Results show that debt, firm size, and asset tangibility positively and significantly affect debt 
maturity. However, the factors of agency costs and companies belonging to holdings significantly 
reduce debt terms. These results are similar to those shown for firms with high growth opportunities. 
Now, the positive effect of debt on debt maturity supports the hypothesis H1. Regardless of growth 
opportunities level, firms extend the debt-term as a way to mitigate liquidity risk.
Another similar and transverse result for growth opportunities is ownership structure. Ownership 
concentration significantly reduces debt terms, while dilution extends them. However, the manager 
being an outsider has no impact on debt maturity.
External monitoring has a negative and significant relationship with debt maturity. External fun-
ders who monitor companies with low growth opportunities tend to mitigate risk on debts issued by 
inducing shorter-term debts. Such an action corroborates approaches by Billett et al. (2007), Jiraporn 
and Tong (2008), and Alcock et al. (2011), as reducing debt maturity has a mitigating effect similar to 
the effect that restrictive debt contract covenants have on debt agency costs.
Table 6. Tobit regression, debt maturity in firms with low growth opportunities.
Variable
Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Owner/manager
-0.0182   -0.0203   
 (-5.77)***   (-3.75)***  
Business associate manager
 0.0606   0.0193  
 (3.91)***   (4.12)***  
Outsider Manager
  -0.0005   -0.0015
   (-0.09)  (-0.23)
Previous dismissal
-0.0071 -0.0190 -0.0087    
 (-0.88) (-1.16) (-1.02)   
Non-operating business
   -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0017
   (-0.84) (-0.92) (-1.03)
Operating expenses to sales
-0.0538 -0.1035 -0.0521 -0.0361 -0.0366 -0.0349
(-8.83)*** (-8.95)*** (-8.49)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.63)*** (-3.29)***
Size
0.0120 0.0014 0.0133 0.0138 0.0147 0.0157
(21.98)*** (26.45)*** (26.28)*** (9.74)*** (8.26)*** (12.44)***
Monitoring of external funders
-0.0039 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0186 -0.0131 -0.0149
(-2.33)** (-2.95)*** (-2.46)** (-3.32)*** (-2.91)*** (-2.84)***
Debt to equity
0.0119 0.0121 0.0120 0.0119 0.0139 0.0123
(23.49)*** (23.71)*** (23.58)*** (11.78)*** (10.92)*** (11.78)***
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Variable
Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Holding
-0.0090 -0.0059 -0.0088 -0.0124 -0.0106 -0.0162
(-3.22)*** (-2.09)** (-2.99)*** (-2.84)*** (-2.33)** (-3.85)***
Tangibility
0.0807 0.0803 0.0799 0.0723 0.0893 0.0717
(21.88)*** (21.93)*** (22.12)*** (9.78)*** (8.95)*** (9.35)***
Test 1 (21.92)*** (15.51)*** (17.38)*** (17.99)*** (16.46)*** (19.27)***
Observations (firms) 7802 7802 7802 7802 7802 7802
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.33
 
Estimated by maximum likelihood and use of robust variances. Marginal effects. Z-statistics in brackets. 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration.
Managerial discretion variables, previous dismissal, and the number of non-operating businesses 
have no statistically significant effects on debt maturity. This result does not support hypothesis H2. 
Regarding this, at a significance level of 1%, Test 1 is rejected. This result, similar to what has been 
previously observed for firms with high growth opportunities, indicates that the net effect of the debt 
decision and agency costs promotes debt term reduction. This result does not support hypothesis H3.
6. Conclusions
Debt maturity in Chilean companies is an area with many points of view to be studied, mainly because 
of its relevance in corporate decisions. There is a vast amount of international literature that analyzes 
debt maturity determinants. However, there are very few studies in Chile on this topic, and none have 
characterized the impact of managerial discretion on these decisions.
Despite the difficulty of measuring managerial discretion, our research provides unprecedented 
evidence for the Chilean market about the role of this factor on debt maturity, conditioning its effects 
according to firm growth opportunities.
Results suggest that the effect of managerial discretion on debt terms depends on whether or 
not companies have growth opportunities. When firms have high growth opportunities, managerial 
discretion promotes longer debt maturities. This reveals two essential aspects about managerial be-
havior. On one hand, it shows the mechanisms of internal monitoring or self-imposed restrictions by 
managers to promote improvement of past discretionary behavior, directly affecting debt maturity. 
On the other hand, this managerial decision demonstrates a preference to mitigate the liquidity risk 
in relation to shortening debt terms to mitigate the overinvestment problem. 
No statistically significant results of managerial discretion on debt maturity are observed for 
firms with low growth opportunities.
Another important result is related to the effects of monitoring by external funders. In firms with 
high growth opportunities, monitoring by external funders has no significant effect on debt maturity, 
and when opportunities are low, such monitoring has a negative effect. These results suggest that 
external funders exchange their monitoring role for internal company mechanisms or self-imposed 
restrictions by managers when firms have high growth opportunities. Thus, external funders mitigate 
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risks related to company funds by inducing shorter debt maturities. Such an effect is similar to the 
role of restrictive clauses in debt contracts (Billett et al., 2007).
Our research also provides evidence supporting previous studies, regardless of firm growth oppor-
tunity levels. This evidence is related to the impact of agency costs, whether the company belongs to 
business holdings, firm size, debts, and asset tangibility.
Agency costs and pertinence to business holdings have a negative effect on debt maturity. In the 
first case, firms with higher agency costs shorten debt maturity as a way to mitigate overinvestment 
problems. In the second case, firms belonging to business holdings develop internal markets where 
they obtain financing under shorter terms and at a lower cost. This action mitigates underinvestment 
effects and supports compliance with hierarchical funding. These findings corroborate the results 
of Azofra et al. (2004) and Saona and Vallelado (2005).
Debt levels, firm size, and asset tangibility are variables that positively and significantly affect 
debt maturity. In the case of debt, our results support the conclusions of Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Johnson (2003) that firms are financed with longer debt terms to avoid 
insolvency. Additionally, asset tangibility effects confirm that companies match assets and liabilities 
for the same reason.
From the point of view of corporate decisions, our research has marked implications. Firstly, firms 
decide debt maturity by accounting for the difficulties imposed by overinvestment, underinvestment, 
and liquidity risks. Close to 82% of the sample correspond jointly to medium, small, and micro en-
terprises which, because of their size, are financed under shorter debt terms. For these companies, 
decisions appear to be dominated by preferences of avoiding liquidity risk. However, the agency 
costs would force companies to reduce debt-term to control potential problems on investment policy 
(overinvestment/underinvestment). This result is transversal to growth opportunities.
Secondly, growth opportunities determine the effects of managerial discretion on debt maturities. 
Firms with high growth opportunities and internal monitoring discipline managers, while in firms 
with low opportunities, monitoring is performed by external funders in shorter terms.
Finally, we suggest extending empirical literature on Chilean markets through two future inves-
tigations. First, it would be interesting to further analyze the relationship between managerial dis-
cretion and corporate decisions as well as how these factors affect company performance. Secondly, 
analyzing the effects of liquidity risk on corporate decisions is another niche that may concentrate 
an interest for future research.
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